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Abstract
 
This paper advances theory on the process of 
collaboration between entities and its implications on 
the quality of services, information, and/or products 
(SIPs) that the collaborating entities provide to each 
other. It investigates the scenario of outsourced IS 
projects (such as custom software development) 
where the extent of collaboration between a client and 
vendor is high. Using the social exchange theory, the 
proposed conceptual model tries to establish the 
“bidirectional” nature of SIP quality in a 
collaborative environment, where the SIPs exchanged 
are possibly “dependent” on each other, and if any 
entity wishes to receive high SIP quality then it should 
make efforts to provide high SIP quality in return too. 
Furthermore, it advocates increasing efforts to link 
financial stakes (tangible or intangible monetary 
benefits or risks) to the quality of SIP being 
continuously exchanged throughout the project life-
cycle.  
 
Keywords: service, information, product, quality, 
outsourcing, collaboration, bidirectional, social 
exchange theory 
. 
1. Introduction 
 
Service quality, information quality, and product 
quality have most often been assumed to be 
unidirectional (one-way delivery); i.e., the customer 
simply purchases services, information and/or 
products from the provider [3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 
20]. However, as highlighted in later sections, in the 
collaboration environment of IS outsourcing, the 
collaborating entities (namely clients and vendors) 
receive various forms of services, information and/or 
products (SIPs) from each other (that is, bidirectional 
or two-way exchanges of SIPs). Often, the service, 
information and/or product (SIP) an entity receives 
from its collaborator serves as a significant input to 
the SIP that the entity will return to its collaborator. In 
other words, the SIP any entity receives from its 
collaborator may be “dependent” on the service that it 
had earlier provided to the collaborator. The term 
“bidirectional” is used to describe the phenomenon 
where collaborating entities (e.g., a client and a 
vendor) provide/receive SIPs (services, information 
and/or products) to/from each other in a collaboration 
project (such as an outsourced custom software 
development project). 
 
CLIENT WORK VENDOR WORK
Pre and Post 
Installation Support
User Acceptance 
Testing (UAT) UAT Defect Fixing
Testing of Iteratively 
delivered modules
&
Change Management
High Level Design
Business Requirements 
Determination Requirements Analysis
Low Level or Detailed 
Design, & Prototypes
Propose System & 
Database Architecture 
Technical Analysis of 
System & Database 
Architecture 
Module-1: Coding, Unit 
testing
System Testing
Module-2: Coding, Unit 
& Integration testing
Module-n: Coding, Unit 
& Integration testing
Installation
Project Planning & 
Scheduling
Vendor side project 
Planning & Scheduling
Figure 1. Example: continuous bidirectional 
exchanges in custom software development 
 
For example, let us consider a collaboration 
environment where a client decides to selectively 
outsource certain activities of a large custom software 
development project to a vendor.  As shown in figure-
1, the client comes up with the initial overall project 
plan, on the basis of which the vendor comes up with 
a detailed project plan for the activities to be 
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performed at the vendor site, and also offers 
suggestions for changes needed in the overall project 
plan (if any). The client and vendor will of course 
continuously interact and discuss possible options and 
alternatives for the project plan, until the plan is 
finalized. Such continuous interactions and exchanges 
will be prevalent throughout the remaining phases of 
the software development life cycle, with each entity 
(client and vendor) receiving inputs from the other for 
their respective tasks. After the project planning is 
completed, the client would primarily provide the 
business-requirements reports, propose system and 
database architecture, and suggest a high level design 
to the vendor, while the vendor would perform 
requirements analysis, technically analyze of the 
proposed system and database architecture, and 
suggest detailed or low-level designs and prototypes. 
Further, the large software project would be divided 
into smaller modules, and each module would have to 
be coded, unit tested, and integration tested by the 
vendor before delivery to the client. The client would 
also test each of the modules being iteratively 
delivered by the vendor to verify that the business 
requirements and design needs are being met, and 
return the test result reports to the vendor for suitable 
defect fixing. The final system would then by tested 
by the vendor, before the client arranges for user 
acceptance testing of the software. Additionally, each 
activity in the software development life cycle 
described above would involve significant 
communication, negotiation, detailed documentation, 
and report generation. Hence, there is a continuous 
two-way or “bidirectional” exchange between the 
entities (client and vendor). Also, an activity that has 
to be performed by one entity may be “dependent” 
upon the other entity’s previously performed activity.  
 
1.1. Service, Product and Information Quality 
 
Moving on from the example in the previous 
section, it is proposed that the collaboration would 
broadly involve the exchange of the following three 
attributes:  
(1) Services: Since tangible cues are much fewer in 
services (and are often limited to the service 
provider’s physical facilities, equipment and 
personnel), the receiver of the service has to rely on 
intangible attributes like reliability, responsiveness, 
assurance, and empathy associated with the delivered 
service, and therefore evaluate the “process” of 
service delivery (or service quality) and not solely the 
outcome of the service (which may even be a product 
or just information) [19, 20, 21, 22].  
(2) Information: Significant amounts of 
“information” (such as project status/schedule 
information, or business and technical requirements 
information) is exchanged in a collaboration 
environment, and the associated “information 
quality” would be possibly perceived by the receiver 
based on attributes such as reliability, relevance, 
accuracy, precision, completeness, currency and 
timeliness of the information [11, p.183; 18, p.44; 24, 
p.93]. Information is exchanged both formally 
(documents, reports, emails, letters, meetings, 
teleconferences …) and informally (discussing work 
near the water cooler, phone calls, chat, gossip, …) 
between collaborating personnel. Information may be 
conveyed through various modes of communication 
such verbal, visual, or written. The information may 
be directly associated with the services or products 
being exchanged, or may be independent information.  
(3) Products: Tangible intermediate or final 
“products” (such as reports specific to 
systems/modules, code/programs, prototypes, 
requirement documents, design documents, test result 
documents, project status documents, etc…) are 
delivered by one entity to another, and the “product 
quality” for each of which would be possibly 
perceived by the receiver based on attributes such as 
performance, features, reliability, conformance, 
durability, serviceability, aesthetics, or overall quality 
[10, 20]. The philosophy of quality as “zero defects – 
doing it right the first time” [20, p.41] or as 
“conformance to requirements” [5] are targeted 
towards the quality of goods or products.  The quality 
of products such as software codes or programs can 
be assessed by reviewing the software code for 
adherence to coding standards, and by running and 
testing the code. The quality of the test result 
documents can be assessed by verifying the 
comprehensive coverage of the tests, verifying 
adherence to documentation standards, and finally the 
effectiveness in finding defects. The quality of design 
documents can be assessed by validating if the design 
meets the requirements, if the design documentation 
follows documentation standards, and finally if the 
design is easily comprehensible to the software 
developers. The quality requirements can be assessed 
by their conceptual clarity and feasibility (within the 
technology and business constraints), and if the 
requirements specification documentation standards 
are followed. 
 
Furthermore, both the provider and receiver of the 
SIPs affect the process since the receiver’s input 
becomes critical to the quality of SIP delivered by the 
provider. For example, the barber’s service quality 
would be affected by the customer’s description of 
how the haircut should look (that is, customer’s 
information quality), the doctor’s service quality 
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would be affected by the patient’s description of 
symptoms, and the quality of software developed by 
an IS vendor would be affected by their client’s 
clarity in describing and documenting requirements. 
[19, 20, 21, 22].  
 
1.2. Collaboration Issues in IS outsourcing 
 
The decision to outsource information systems (IS) 
related work such as custom development of software 
is growing because organizations need diverse and 
high-quality IS skills at low costs that enables it to 
survive and excel in the rapidly changing external 
environment [1, 3, 4, 7, 16]. Though clients often 
selectively outsource certain functions of the custom 
software development project [17], they put the entire 
onus of the success of the project on the vendor. 
Clients sometimes fail to realize the importance of 
“collaboration” in a collaboration project, and 
wrongly assume that since they are paying the vendor 
for certain services, information or products, the 
entire responsibility of the success or failure of the IS 
project is on the vendor. Hence, vendors are 
sometimes made scapegoats for a failed project that 
either slipped in schedule or failed to deliver the 
client’s desired functionality [16, 23]. It is important 
to realize that for a collaboration project to be 
successful, the onus for the success of the project 
should be on the shoulders of each of the 
collaborators, i.e., both the client and the vendor, and 
not just the vendor which often plays a subservient 
role to the client’s authority.  
While it is important for the client to make sure 
that it truly collaborates with the vendor by providing 
the vendor with highest possible quality of SIPs (in 
addition to the required payments), it is important for 
the vendor to realize that the client’s future in the 
competitive international business environment may 
be dependent on the successful execution of the 
outsourced project. Hence every effort should be 
made by the vendor to garner maximum support and 
knowledge from the client such that it can deliver 
high quality SIPs to the client. IS work is the vendor’s 
“core” capability; however, for the client its “core” 
capability may not lie in IS but instead in other 
business sectors [1, 4, 16] such as travel, energy, 
entertainment, or manufacturing (which make use of 
IS to survive in the competitive marketplace). Hence 
the vendor’s quality of SIPs in the IS project should 
definitely be of the highest standards, such that the 
client can learn, imbibe, and replicate the same.  
By theorizing on the SIP quality that collaborating 
entities (i.e., the client and the vendor) receive from 
each other, we try to establish the relationship and 
dependency between the SIP quality that each 
receives from the other. If such a relationship and the 
existence of “dependency” is established then it 
would be appropriate to state that if one wants to 
receive good SIP quality in collaboration projects, 
then one must be ready to offer high SIP quality in the 
collaboration too. If it is established that financial 
stakes (tangible or intangible monetary gains or 
losses) in providing or receiving SIP quality have a 
positive influence on the quality of SIP that is 
exchanged between collaborators, then it would be 
pertinent to suggest that collaboration projects should 
increase efforts to link financial stakes to the 
continuous delivery of high SIP quality throughout 
the lifecycle of the project.   
Though the concept of linking financial stakes to 
the final outcome i.e., “outsourcing success”, has 
already been established [16, 23], the linking of 
financial stakes to the continuous delivery of high SIP 
quality during an ongoing collaboration project (and 
not just the final outcome) is seemingly nonexistent. 
For example, Sparrow [23] explained benefit-based 
relationships by giving the example of the UK 
government’s employment service (the client) and 
EDS (the vendor), where both the parties (client and 
vendor) made an upfront investment in a relationship, 
and thereafter shared both the benefits and the risks 
by establishing a payment methodology that links 
EDS’s reward to realized outcomes. Similarly, Millar 
[1994, as cited in 16, pp. 4-5] wrote about business 
benefit contracting, that involves a contractual 
agreement defining the vendor's contribution to the 
client in terms of specific benefits to the business and 
defining the payment the client will make based upon 
the vendor's ability to deliver those benefits, thereby 
matching actual costs with actual benefits and sharing 
the risks. Though clients and vendors are often vocal 
about the need for business benefit contracting, its 
actual adoption has been a challenge due to the 
difficulty associated with measuring benefits gained 
by clients and linking them to an increase (or 
decrease) in vendor’s revenue or profit margins [16].  
 
1.3. Research Questions 
 
We know that service quality, information quality 
and product quality are important in a collaboration 
environment such as IS outsourcing. But the IS 
outsourcing literature is primarily concerned with 
their unidirectional nature or one-way transmission, 
and not the bidirectional nature of the continuous 
exchange of services, information and products that 
are prevalent in collaboration environments. We do 
not know how the “dependency” between the SIPs 
being exchanged in a collaboration environment 
affects the SIP quality. The influence of “financial 
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stakes” on SIP quality in a collaboration environment 
is also not known. These are gaps in the literature that 
need to be researched. This study intends to address 
the following questions: 
 
When entities collaborate by continuously exchanging 
SIPs:  
• Is there any relationship between the SIP qualities 
that each entity receives from the other? 
• Does the dependency between the SIPs being 
provided and received (exchanged) affect their 
quality? 
• Does each entity’s financial stakes in SIPs being 
exchanged affect their quality? 
 
This “bidirectional” nature of SIP quality is built 
on a theoretical framework that is based on the social 
exchange theory and its adaptation to SIP quality. 
Future research will be aimed at empirically testing 
(using field studies) the conceptual model (to be 
proposed in this paper), which attempts to address the 
mentioned issues. 
 
2. Theoretical Development 
 
Wang et al. [25] argue that custom software 
development projects involve extensive 
communication where clients and vendors solicit 
information, requirements and operational procedures. 
Their model is based on two main assumptions: (1) 
the negotiation between the entities involved in 
software development (for e.g., client and vendor) is 
primarily non-cooperative with each focusing greater 
on their own self-interests rather than their 
collaborator’s interests, and (2) there is an imbalance 
in the information available or shared, which 
intensifies the need for greater communication. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that greater 
communication, participation and mutual monitoring 
between the involved entities helps in reducing 
uncertainties. In this paper, the prevalence of 
continuous exchange of SIPs between the clients and 
vendors in a custom software development project 
will be explained using the social exchange theory, 
which will also corroborate the need for considering 
SIPs in collaboration environments as having a 
“bidirectional dependency”. 
 
2.1. Outsourcing 
 
Due to various factors, organizations (clients) often 
need to outsource work to external entities (vendors) 
[1, 4, 7, 16]. Hence, when the service, information, 
and/or product provider is a non-client entity, such as 
a vendor/supplier, the process is known as 
outsourcing.  When the service, information, and/or 
product provider to the client is a client-entity such as 
a subsidiary or the internal IS department of the 
client, it is known as insourcing. Outsourcing has 
been defined in ways that espouse a selective 
approach, for example: "…selectively turning over to 
a vendor some or all of the IS functions…”  [1, p. 
289], "…contracting of various information systems' 
sub-functions…”  [3, p. 131], and "...turn over part or 
all of an organization's IS functions to external 
service provider(s)…”  [4, p. 209]. 
Selective sourcing is the practice of outsourcing 
select IS applications to vendors, while retaining other 
IS applications in-house [17, pp. 13-14], based on 
their respective strengths and capabilities (see figure 
2).   
 
capitalize on strength of internal  IS department
capitalize on strength of external vendors
CLIENT
VENDOR
IS Project 
Insourced 
work
Outsourced
work
IS Dept.
(cooperative environment )
Figure 2. Selective & Cooperative sourcing 
 
Outsourcing can be flexible & modular where all 
the IS functions are broken down into multiple 
modules, some of which are outsourced and some are 
retained in-house based on cost analysis, technology 
and resource needs. In selective sourcing, clients 
outsource between 20 to 60% of the IS budget to 
vendors (typically around 40%) while still retaining a 
substantial internal (or in-house) IS department [16, p. 
4, pp. 223-224; 5, p. 10]. When a targeted IS activity 
is performed jointly by the client’s internal IS 
department and the vendor, it is also known as 
cooperative sourcing [Millar, 1994, as cited in 16, pp. 
4-5]. Collaboration involves a client selectively 
outsourcing certain functions of a project (such as 
custom software development) to a vendor, and 
thereafter both the client and vendor work 
cooperatively towards the success of the whole 
project (see figure 2). When clients and vendors 
collaborate, they exchange services, information 
and/or products (SIPs).  
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2.2. Social Exchange Theory & Bidirectional 
SIP Flow 
 
Attempts have been made to apply the social 
exchange theory to IS outsourcing in the literature to 
study various relationship, vendor, and contract 
characteristics [14, 15]. Be it collaboration between 
individuals, teams, companies or nations, it has 
always been a “give and take” relationship as 
established by the social exchange theory. Social 
exchange has been defined by Blau [2] as the 
“voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated 
by the returns they are expected to bring and typically 
do in fact bring from others” (see figure 3). Figure-4 
illustrates the exchanges in a custom software 
development project. In addition to paying the vendor, 
the client has to also provide the vendor with 
extensive “inputs” (such as requirements, high-level 
design, business knowledge, and test results of the 
software coded by the vendor), such that vendor can 
use these extensive “inputs” to effectively provide the 
SIPs they are being paid for (such as low-level design 
of the software, writing of software code, and testing 
the software being coded).  
 
Returns
(expected/actual)
...for motivated action
Action 
...motivated by 
expected/actual returns
Returns 
(expected/actual)
...for motivated action
Action
...motivated by 
expected/actual returns
• Reciprocity
• Balance/
Equilibrium
• Cohesion
• PowerAccountingCLIENT AccountingVENDOR
Figure 3. Social exchange theory 
 
We characterize the extensive “inputs” that the 
client gives to a vendor as client-to-vendor “services”, 
“information”, or “products” (or appropriate 
combinations of these) that are used to ensure that the 
vendor can satisfactorily perform its role. The “client-
to-vendor” SIPs and “vendor-to-client” SIPs together 
comprise the “bidirectional” SIPs in the outsourcing 
collaboration (see figure 4). Note that the payments 
made by the client to the vendor are distinct from the 
SIPs, and is later discussed as a component of 
“financial stakes” that effect Bidirectional SIP 
Quality. 
 
Client Vendor 
payments
Schedule estimates , 
requirements , high-level design , 
business knowledge transfer , 
testing, development of 
application interfaces , 
… and documentation for all of 
these.
Low-level design , development 
(programming ), testing, project status, 
schedule and effort estimates 
… and documentation for all of these
client-to-vendor 
Service / 
Information / 
Products
vendor -to-client 
Service / 
Information / 
Products
Figure 4: Bidirectional flow of SIPs 
 
Emerson [8] noted the following four social-
exchange attributes: (1) Reciprocity -a mutual 
exchange as a result of the need to reciprocate the 
benefits received, (2) Balance - an equilibrium or 
equality in distribution due to mutual dependence 
between each of the actors in an exchange, (3) 
Cohesion – sticking together when one or more entity 
runs into a conflict involving the exchange, and (4) 
Power - the amount of monetary influence one can 
exercise on the other. Section 2.3 will further discuss 
the relevance of these attributes in forming constructs.  
It is important to note that a collaboration 
environment is not necessarily limited to two entities 
alone, examples of which are: (1) multiple-vendor 
sourcing (one client, many vendors), (2) Co-sourcing 
(alliance of multiple contract with a single vendor), 
and (3) Complex sourcing (multiple clients and 
multiple vendors in the same outsourcing contract or 
alliance) [3; 6, pp. 122-123; 7, pp. 12-13; 9, pp. 1-6].  
Though such collaboration arrangements seem to be 
very complex to handle with respect to the proposed 
research question, we should recognize that the 
collaboration in terms of exchange of SIPs between 
entities is often on a one-to-one basis.  That is, it can 
be assumed that each entity establishes a direct 
relationship, communicates and deals individually 
with each of its collaborators. Hence, the to-and-fro 
flow of SIPs between any two collaborators may be 
considered to “bidirectional” irrespective of the total 
number of collaborators. 
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2.3. The Constructs 
 
As discussed earlier, the social exchange theory 
speaks about actions that are motivated by the returns 
they are anticipated to bring. On similar lines, the 
quality of SIPs provided (i.e., the actions) of entities 
in a collaboration are motivated by the returns they 
are anticipated to bring. We introduce two constructs 
that are directly related to the exchange of SIPs:   
(a) Bidirectional SIP Quality Dependency: This 
construct determines the necessity for an entity to 
provide its collaborator with high SIP quality, if the 
entity wants to receive high quality SIPs in return 
from its collaborator. In other words, if any entity 
wishes to receive high SIP quality then it should make 
efforts to provide high SIP quality too. In a 
collaboration environment, the SIP quality an entity 
receives from its collaborator may be “dependent” on 
the SIP quality that it provides to the collaborator, and 
this is termed the entity’s “bidirectional SIP quality 
dependency”. This is in line with Emerson’s [8] social 
exchange attributes of “reciprocity” (a mutual 
exchange as a result of the need to reciprocate the 
benefits received) and “balance” (an equilibrium or 
equality in distribution due to mutual dependence 
between each of the actors in an exchange).   
(b) Financial stakes in Bidirectional SIP Quality: 
The payments made (by the client to the vendor) and 
possible monetary gains and losses are certainly the 
most obvious and visible “financial stakes”. In 
addition to immediate financial concerns, financial 
implications of intangibles such as goodwill, trust and 
future business prospects should also be considered. 
This is in line with Emerson’s [8] social exchange 
attribute of “power” (the amount of monetary 
influence one can exercise on the other).  
The “financial stakes in bidirectional SIP quality” 
construct has two dimensions. The first dimension 
“financial stakes in SIP quality provided to 
collaborator” determines if there are any financial 
benefits or costs (financial stakes) in delivering high 
or low SIP quality to a collaborator, respectively; high 
benefits for good SIP quality or high costs for poor 
SIP quality could motivate an entity to deliver high 
SIP quality such that it increases benefits and reduces 
costs. The second dimension “financial stakes in SIP 
quality received from collaborator” determines if 
there is a financial gain or loss if an entity receives 
good or poor SIP quality respectively; financial gains 
due to good quality and financial losses due to poor 
quality of received SIPs will motivate the entity to 
press the need for high quality from its collaborator 
that is providing the SIPs.  
 
Bidirectional SIP Quality “Dependency” :
• If we have to receive high quality service/
information /products (SIP) from our 
collaborator , is it necessary for us to 
provide our collaborator with high SIP 
quality too? Is the SIP Quality we receive 
dependent on the SIP Quality we 
provide?
“Financial Stakes” in Bidirectional SIP 
Quality*:
For SIP (Service/Information /Product ) Quality 
provided to collaborator :
• Are there any financial benefits if we 
deliver high SIP Quality to our 
collaborator? 
• Are there any financial costs if we deliver 
low SIP Quality to our collaborator? 
For SIP (Service/Information /Product ) Quality 
received from collaborator :
• If our collaborator provides us with good 
SIP Quality will I gain financially ? 
• If our collaborator provides us with poor 
SIP Quality will I lose financially? 
*Note: Apart from immediate financial 
concerns , financial implications of goodwill , 
future business prospects , and other 
intangibles should be considered here .
Entity-1
Perceived SIP Quality :
Does the received SIP 
(Service/Information/
Product) Quality match 
our expectations ?
Bidirectional SIP delivery
• Bidirectional SIP Quality 
Dependency ?
• Financial Stakes in 
Bidirectional SIP Quality ? 
• Perceived 
SIP Quality ?
Entity-2
(Collaboration Environment )
 
Figure 5: Service/Information/Product Quality 
in collaboration: The questions asked 
 
Additionally, the construct “Perceived SIP 
Quality” which determines if the received SIP quality 
matches expectations [20, 21, 22], leads to two 
constructs when adapted to the client-vendor 
collaboration scenario: (1) “client-to-vendor” SIP 
quality (perceived by vendor), and (2) “vendor-to-
client” SIP quality (perceived by client), which reflect 
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the bidirectional nature of services within a 
collaboration framework.  
Figure 5 represents each of these constructs in a 
generic question like format where the collaborating 
entities self assess their perceptions about the 
constructs. These questions can form the basis of how 
the respective constructs can be possibly measured. 
From figure 5, it is evident that the generic questions 
asked by both the collaborators are the same. 
However, when the collaborators are actually given 
identities (say a particular client or vendor) these 
questions may then be suitably adapted to address 
their specific concerns.  
 
2.4. Causal effects in Bidirectional SIP Flow 
 
The questions shown in figure-5 when applied to 
the specific collaboration environment of outsourced 
IS projects, can lead to a conceptual model and more 
specific propositions for client-vendor collaborations.   
In figures 6, 7, 8, & 9 that follow, the left side 
contains client related activities & constructs, and the 
right side contains vendor related activities and 
constructs.  The shaded rounded rectangles denote the 
actual activities performed, and the associated bold 
arrows indicate the flow or the order in which the 
activities are performed. The solid rectangles denote 
the perceived SIP quality constructs, while the dashed 
rectangles denote the constructs that effect perceived 
quality (namely the dependency and financial stakes 
constructs). The thin arrows with plus signs indicate a 
positive influence among constructs. 
Figure 6 shows the proposed causal influences 
when a client provides SIPs to a vendor, and receives 
SIPs in return from the vendor. In the first and second 
steps, the client prepares and delivers “client-to-
vendor” SIP to the vendor. The vendor’s attitude 
about its perceived quality of the SIP that it received 
from client, affects the way it prepares the SIP (in the 
third step) that will be delivered (returned) to the 
client. The vendor’s bidirectional SIP quality 
dependency and the vendor’s financial stakes in 
bidirectional SIP quality also influences the quality of 
the “vendor-to-client” SIP delivered in step four.  
 
 
Vendor’s attitude 
about its perceived
Client-to-Vendor SIP 
Quality
Vendor-to-Client 
SIP Quality
(perceived by 
Client)
Vendor’s 
Bidirectional SIP 
Quality Dependency
Vendor’s 
Financial Stakes in 
Bidirectional SIP 
Quality
(+)
(+)
4. 
vendor
to
client 
SIP
3. 
Vendor 
prepares
SIP
2. 
client
to
vendor 
SIP
1. 
Client 
prepares
SIP 
(Service/
Information /
Product)
(+)
VendorClient
 
Figure 6. Causal effects in Bidirectional SIP: 
Client provides SIP to Vendor and receives 
SIP in return from Vendor 
 
 
(+)
(+)
2. 
vendor
to
client 
SIP
4. 
client
to
vendor 
SIP
Client’s Bidirectional 
SIP Quality 
Dependency
Client’s 
Financial Stakes in 
Bidirectional SIP 
Quality
Client-to-Vendor 
SIP Quality
(perceived by 
Vendor )
Client’s attitude about 
its perceived
Vendor-to-Client SIP 
Quality
1. 
Vendor 
prepares
SIP 
(Service/
Information /
Product )
3. 
Client 
prepares
SIP
(+)
VendorClient
 
Figure 7. Causal effects in Bidirectional SIP: 
Vendor provides SIP to Client and receives 
SIP in return from Client 
 
Similarly, figure 7 describes the proposed causal 
influences when a vendor provides SIPs to a client 
and receives SIPs in return from the client.  In the first 
and second steps, the vendor prepares and delivers 
“vendor-to-client” SIP to the client. The client’s 
attitude about its perceived quality of the SIP that it 
received from vendor, affects the way it prepares the 
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SIP (in the third step) that will be delivered (returned) 
to the vendor. The client’s bidirectional SIP quality 
dependency and the client’s financial stakes in 
bidirectional SIP quality also influences the quality of 
the “client-to-vendor” SIP delivered in step four.  
Based on the theoretical development thus far, the 
following are the propositions for possible causal 
effects: 
 
For any two entities (client and vendor) that 
collaborate by providing SIPs to each other … 
• …the higher each entity’s Bidirectional SIP 
Quality Dependency, the higher is the SIP quality 
received by its respective collaborating entity. 
• …the higher each entity’s Financial Stakes in 
Bidirectional SIP Quality, the higher is the SIP 
quality received by its respective collaborating entity. 
• ...an entity’s attitude about its perceived 
quality of the SIP received from its collaborating 
entity will positively influence the quality of SIP that it 
delivers back to the collaborating entity. 
 
2.5. Correlation and Moderating effects in 
Bidirectional SIP Flow 
 
A client’s attitude about its perceived quality of the 
SIP received from its vendor can positively influence 
the quality of SIP that it delivers back to the vendor; 
and on similar logic, a vendor’s attitude about its 
perceived quality of the SIP received from its client, 
can positively influence the quality of SIP that it 
delivers back to the client. Combining these two 
statements, we propose that there is a positive 
relationship (correlation) between the “client-to-
vendor” SIP-quality (perceived by vendor) and 
“vendor-to-client” SIP-quality (perceived by client), 
which is shown in figure 8.   
It is further proposed (see figure 8) that each 
entity’s (the client’s and the vendor’s) perception of 
bidirectional SIP quality dependency and each 
entity’s financial stakes in bidirectional SIP quality 
positively moderates the correlation between the 
“client-to-vendor” SIP-quality (perceived by vendor) 
and “vendor-to-client” SIP-quality (perceived by 
client). This leads to the following propositions on the 
possible correlation and moderation effects: 
 
For any two entities (client and vendor) that 
collaborate by providing SIPs to each other … 
• …there is a positive relationship (correlation) 
between the SIP-quality that each entity receives from 
the other. 
• …the higher each entity’s Bidirectional SIP 
Quality Dependency, the stronger is the correlation 
between the SIP quality that each receives from the 
other. 
• …, the higher each entity’s Financial Stakes 
in Bidirectional SIP Quality, the stronger is the 
correlation between the SIP quality that each receives 
from the other. 
 
Client-to-Vendor SIP 
Quality
(perceived by Vendor )
Vendor’s 
Bidirectional SIP 
Quality Dependency
Vendor
Vendor’s 
Financial Stakes in 
Bidirectional SIP 
Quality
Vendor 
prepares
SIP
client
to
vendor 
SIP
Client’s Bidirectional 
SIP Quality 
Dependency
Client
Client’s 
Financial Stakes in 
Bidirectional SIP 
Quality
Vendor-to-Client 
SIP Quality
(perceived by Client)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
vendor
to
client 
SIP
 Client 
prepares
SIP
(+)
 
Figure 8. Correlation in Bidirectional SIPs 
 
 
 
3. The Conceptual Model – Bidirectional 
SIP Qualities 
 
The conceptual model which is the culmination of 
the theoretical development thus far, shows the 
possible correlation, causal influences and moderating 
influences (see figure 9). When “SIP” quality is 
decomposed into service quality, information quality 
and product quality, the corresponding constructs 
would be (1a) “client-to-vendor” service  quality 
(perceived by vendor), (1b) “vendor-to-client” 
service  quality (perceived by client), (2a) “client-to-
vendor” information quality (perceived by vendor), 
(2b) “vendor-to-client” information  quality 
(perceived by client), (3a) “client-to-vendor” product 
quality (perceived by vendor), and (3b) “vendor-to-
client” product  quality (perceived by client). The 
constructs related to “bidirectional SIP quality 
dependency” and “financial stakes in bidirectional 
SIP quality” have both causal and moderating 
influences. 
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Vendor’s Financial Stakes in 
Bidirectional SIP Quality
Vendor’s Bidirectional SIP 
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(+)
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Vendor -to-Client 
INFORMATION 
Quality 
Vendor -to-Client 
SERVICE Quality 
Vendor -to-Client 
PRODUCT 
Quality 
Vendor-to-Client 
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(perceived by 
Client ) Bidirectional SIP 
Quality
Client-to-Vendor 
INFORMATION 
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SERVICE Quality 
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PRODUCT 
Quality 
Client-to-Vendor 
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(perceived by 
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Figure 9. Conceptual Model: Bidirectional SIP 
Quality in Client-Vendor collaboration 
 
The possible settings for this conceptual model are 
outsourced custom software development projects 
being executed at client and vendor sites. Vendor 
companies for custom software development like 
EDS and Accenture are expected to have a large client 
base, and have a large number of outsourced custom 
software development projects.  The possible sample 
for a field study that can validate this conceptual 
model can have project managers from both vendor 
and client sides from each of these collaboration 
projects. 
A plethora of variables and variance is associated 
with IS outsourcing [1, 4, 7, 18, 25].  The possible 
variations may arise from project size, age of 
relationship, relationship/partnership quality, strategic 
importance, power politics in client-vendor 
relationships, environmental technological 
uncertainty, business uncertainty (external forces), 
discrepancy in support/staff quality, difficulty in 
monitoring performance, time difference in working 
hours, differences in culture etc… the list is endless. 
However, this conceptual model intends to focus 
purely on the quality aspects in the bidirectional 
exchange of services, information and/or products 
between collaborating entities such as clients and 
vendors. All other factors which are not directly 
related to the “bidirectional exchange of services, 
information and/or products” have been kept out to 
keep this model “simple, neat and clean”.  
 
3.1. Building on this model – the next step 
 
This model would certainly be valuable when each 
of the constructs and the relationships are empirically 
tested in a field study involving IS projects. 
Additionally, interactions and relationships with other 
factors not directly related to the “bidirectional 
exchange of services, information and/or products” 
(described in the earlier section) may be considered in 
future research. Also, analysis of bidirectional SIP 
quality in a collaboration environment would be 
valuable when SIP quality trends are periodically 
tracked. A longitudinal study could help establish 
bidirectional SIP quality as something that may be 
improved upon. Clients and vendors, for example, 
would learn about ways to improve bidirectional SIP 
quality by administering instruments that measure 
service, information and product quality (for 
example., the SERVQUAL instrument measures 
service quality [19, 20, 21, 22]) and an employee 
survey every month during the duration of a 
collaboration project, plus systematically soliciting 
and analyzing suggestions and complaints from its 
collaborators [22, p.31].  
 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
 
The research community which was hitherto 
concerned with only the unidirectional nature of SIPs, 
and not the bidirectional nature of SIPs that are 
prevalent in collaboration environments, will get a 
new direction for further research after this conceptual 
model is established. Bidirectional service, 
information and/or product quality in collaboration 
environments is unexplored. Knowledge about “why, 
what, when, or how” bidirectional dependencies and 
financial stakes in collaborative environments 
influence exchange of services, information and/or 
products will be useful for future research.  
By visualizing the SIP quality that collaborating 
entities (i.e., the client and the vendor) receive from 
each other as having a “bidirectional dependency”, 
the conceptual model tries to establish a well reasoned 
relationship between the SIP-quality that each entity 
receives from the other. If such a relationship is 
established then it would be appropriate to state that if 
one wants to receive good SIP quality in collaboration 
projects, then one must be ready to offer high SIP 
quality to the collaborators too. If it is established that 
financial stakes in providing or receiving SIP quality 
has a positive influence on the quality of SIP that is 
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exchanged between collaborators, then it would be 
pertinent to suggest that collaboration projects should 
increase efforts to link financial stakes to service, 
information and/or product quality.  
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